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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Defendant Ford Motor Company ("Ford") appeals from an 
order of the district court dated March 13, 1996, entered 
March 15, 1996, granting partial summary judgment in 
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favor of plaintiff Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. ("Liberty") on 
the grounds that Ford's assessment of a dealer-parity 
surcharge ("DPS") violated the New Jersey Franchise 
Practices Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-15(a) (West Supp. 
1997). Ford also appeals from the district court's order of 
September 19, 1996, entered September 23, 1996, 
amending the March 13 order nunc pro tunc to preclude 
Ford from altering certain practices that were in effect as of 
the date of the March order. Liberty cross appeals from the 
district court's March 13, 1996 dismissal of its claim 
alleging illegal price discrimination under the Robinson- 
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 13(a), and from the portions of the 
district court's February 26, 1997 final order entered 
February 27, 1997, rejecting Liberty's claim for damages 
incurred before December 1991, denying recovery of certain 
fees, and awarding prejudgment interest at the rates set 
forth in New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-11. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over Liberty's state law 
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1332 based on diversity of 
citizenship and the requisite amount in controversy, and 
over Liberty's federal law claim under 28 U.S.C. S 1331. 
This court's jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. S 1291 based on 
the district court's entry of the final order dated February 
26, 1997, and entered February 27, 1997.1  For the reasons 
that follow, we will reverse the district court's September 
19, 1996 order, and will vacate the district court's order 
awarding attorneys' fees and remand that issue for 
reconsideration. We otherwise will affirm. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Ford initially filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court's 
September 19, 1996 order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1), which 
provides that "the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
from . . . [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting . 
. . 
injunctions . . . ." By order of this court the interlocutory appeal, 
which 
was docketed as number 96-5762, was consolidated with Ford's appeal 
in number 97-5189 and Liberty's cross appeal in number 97-5190 from 
the district court's final order. The district court on April 25, 1997, 
entered a supplemental final order dated April 22, 1997, which is not at 
issue in this appeal. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
On March 11, 1976, Ford and Liberty entered into a 
franchise agreement by executing Ford's standard "Lincoln 
and Mercury Sales and Service Agreements." Pursuant to 
the agreement, Ford, a motor vehicle manufacturer and 
franchisor, sells vehicles at wholesale prices to Liberty, 
which in turn sells them to consumers at retail prices. The 
retail vehicle sales are accompanied by a warranty issued 
by Ford to the consumer, guaranteeing that Ford will 
replace certain systems or parts in the vehicle free of 
charge. See app. at 38; 173. 
 
Under the standard franchise agreement, a franchisee- 
dealer such as Liberty must perform warranty repairs on 
any vehicle brought to its dealership regardless of where 
the owner purchased the vehicle. Ford then must 
reimburse the dealer for the parts and labor associated 
with the warranty repairs. From 1976 until 1991, Ford 
reimbursed Liberty for parts used in warranty repairs 
pursuant to a standard nationwide reimbursement formula. 
Under the relevant version of that formula, Ford 
reimbursed dealers at 30-40% above their cost for parts 
depending on the model of the vehicle repaired. See id. at 
115. 
 
On December 12, 1991, Liberty wrote to Ford, asking to 
be reimbursed for warranty parts at its retail rate of 77% 
above its cost pursuant to the New Jersey Franchise 
Practices Act ("NJFPA"), which provides that a motor vehicle 
franchisor "shall reimburse" its franchisee for parts used in 
warranty repairs at the franchisee's "prevailing retail price," 
provided that the retail price is "not unreasonable." N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 56:10-15(a). See app. at 286. Ford responded 
on January 17, 1992, that it intended "to offset[any] parts 
mark-up above 30%." Ford explained that it would 
"estimate the incremental cost to [Ford] of the higher mark- 
up" Liberty had demanded and would provide Liberty "a 
menu of items" on Liberty's account from which the costs 
could be recovered. Ford informed Liberty that it would 
adjust the amount of its recovery charges "periodically . . . 
to ensure that only incremental costs are recovered." Id. at 
295. 
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On July 7, 1992, after several months of correspondence, 
Ford agreed to reimburse Liberty at Liberty's claimed rate of 
77% above cost although Ford "continue[d] to believe that 
a retail markup of 77% is unreasonably high." App. at 308. 
On October 1, 1992, Ford reminded Liberty "that there 
would be cost recovery," and informed Liberty that it was 
"reviewing the nature of the recoveries that will be 
implemented." Id. at 319. Ford then wrote to Liberty on 
November 5, 1992, confirming its agreement to reimburse 
Liberty at a 77% markup retroactive to December 12, 1991, 
the date Liberty first demanded retail-rate reimbursement, 
and announcing that Ford would recover the cost of paying 
the incremental reimbursement through a "dealer parity 
surcharge." Id. at 321. 
 
Ford explained, 
 
       [a]s you know, parity between dealers, and parity in 
       the overall economic relationship between Ford and its 
       dealers, is essential. It is necessary for Ford to 
       maintain dealer parity, notwithstanding Ford's 
       acceptance of your request to be reimbursed for 
       warranty parts at a markup exceeding the mark-up 
       which Ford extends uniformly to all dealers nationally. 
 
       To maintain that parity, and to ensure fairness to the 
       overwhelming majority of dealers who are satisfied with 
       . . . a uniform warranty parts reimbursement mark-up, 
       and to recover our increased costs . . . . [c]osts 
       incurred through today will be divided by the total 
       number of vehicles in your dealership's inventory and 
       . . . `in-transit' to your dealership . . . . The quotient 
       will constitute a dealer parity surcharge to your 
       wholesale price for each such vehicle. 
 
Id. Ford informed Liberty that after this initial cost 
recovery, "[i]ncremental costs incurred during each period 
. . . will be divided by the total number of vehicles invoiced 
. . . . The quotient will constitute the surcharge to your 
wholesale vehicle price for each such vehicle." Id. Ford 
assured Liberty that, [i]n the event the total monthly 
surcharge differs from the incremental [reimbursement] 
costs incurred by Ford, the aggregate amount of any excess 
or shortfall to the surcharge . . . will be netted against the 
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Costs used to determine the surcharge for the immediately 
subsequent Billing Period." Id. at 322. 
 
In correspondence dated December 21, 1992, Liberty 
requested additional reimbursements to supplement the 
below-retail reimbursements it had received for warranty 
parts it installed between 1986 and December 12, 1991. 
See id. at 326. Ford rejected that claim. See id. at 346. 
 
On October 5, 1992, Liberty filed a class action in federal 
district court for the District of New Jersey on behalf of 38 
New Jersey Lincoln-Mercury dealers, alleging that Ford's 
warranty reimbursement practices violated the NJFPA. On 
May 14, 1993, the district court, finding that the dealers' 
claims required a "part-by-part, sale-by-sale" analysis of 
each dealer's retail rate, denied the motion for class 
certification for lack of the requisite commonality among 
the dealers' claims. Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford 
Mktg. Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 76 (D.N.J. 1993) ("Liberty I"). 
The court later dismissed Liberty I without prejudice by 
consent of the parties. 
 
Liberty then filed this action on June 30, 1995. In its 
complaint and amended complaint Liberty alleged that 
Ford's imposition of the DPS violated the NJFPA's mandate 
that Ford reimburse Liberty for warranty parts at Liberty's 
prevailing retail price. Liberty also alleged that by imposing 
the DPS on Liberty but not on its competitors, Ford had 
engaged in unlawful price discrimination in violation of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. S 13(a).2 
 
Liberty moved for summary judgment as to liability on 
both claims and Ford moved to dismiss Liberty's price 
discrimination claim. By order dated March 13, 1996, the 
district court granted Liberty's motion for summary 
judgment as to its NJFPA claim and granted Ford's motion 
to dismiss Liberty's price discrimination claim. The district 
court found that Ford was "engaged in a shell game, the 
purpose of which is to avoid, altogether, the costs of 
complying with the NJFPA." Slip op. at 9. Finding that the 
DPS, by effectively reducing Liberty's reimbursements from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Liberty consented to the dismissal of several other claims which are 
not at issue in this appeal. 
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Liberty's retail rate to Ford's standard rate, "essentially 
nullified [Ford's] compliance and created an end-run 
around the Act," the district court concluded that it "would 
be formalistic, in the extreme," to find that Ford had paid 
Liberty the requisite reimbursement "when [Ford] charges 
back the very benefits which the Act intends to confer." Id. 
at 8-9. The court thus held that the DPS violated the "clear 
language of the NJFPA" by denying Liberty reimbursement 
at its retail rate. Id. at 11. The court concluded, however, 
that because the DPS placed Liberty in the same economic 
position as competitors who received only standard 
reimbursements at 30-40% above cost, it did not give rise 
to a price discrimination claim under the Robinson-Patman 
Act. See id. at 12-13. 
 
Thereafter Ford discontinued the DPS, and on April 29, 
1996, wrote to all New Jersey dealers announcing new 
policies for processing retail-rate reimbursement claims. 
The policies required dealers to document their claimed 
retail prices as to each warranty part by attaching retail 
customer repair orders for the same part installed in 
similar vehicles within the preceding six months. See app. 
at 513, 516. Ford also informed the dealers that "payment 
of warranty parts reimbursement at levels higher than 
[standard] reimbursement levels will be recovered . . . as 
with other regulatory compliance costs." Id. at 514. 
 
On May 15, 1996, Liberty submitted a request for retail- 
rate reimbursement for warranty parts installed during 
April and May 1996. Ford rejected the request for failure to 
satisfy Ford's new documentation requirements. See app. at 
736-42. On June 20, 1996, Liberty filed a "Motion to 
Enforce the Order of March 13, 1996" challenging Ford's 
new policies as imposing insurmountable burdens designed 
to prevent Liberty from receiving retail-rate reimbursement, 
in violation of the NJFPA and the district court's March 
order. Liberty sought sanctions and an order enjoining Ford 
from implementing the new requirements. 
 
Ford responded that the issues raised in Liberty's Motion 
to Enforce were beyond the scope of the complaint and the 
March order, which had addressed only the legality of the 
DPS and were silent as to the proper methods for 
establishing a dealer's retail rate. Ford contended that its 
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new policies were appropriate in light of Liberty I's 
pronouncement favoring a "part-by-part, sale-by-sale" 
analysis of each dealer's retail rate, 149 F.R.D. at 76, and 
sought discovery and the opportunity to develop a factual 
record regarding the nature of the new policies and the 
burdens they entailed. See app. at 729-30. 
 
The district court, without allowing discovery or holding 
an evidentiary hearing, held on September 19, 1996, that in 
adopting its new reimbursement policies Ford had "ignored 
or evaded" the "clear thrust" of the March opinion. Slip op. 
at 1. The court found that the new procedure "appears to 
be onerous in the extreme and designed to frustrate any 
attempt to obtain statutory reimbursement . . . at the 
dealer's prevailing retail rate." Finding, however, that the 
terms of the March order were not "explicit," the court 
denied Liberty's Motion to Enforce, but amended the March 
order nunc pro tunc to forbid Ford from altering its prior 
reimbursement procedure absent Liberty's consent or leave 
of the court. The court also enjoined Ford from"any further 
or other financial imposition on . . . Liberty . .. as a 
recoupment" of Ford's NJFPA compliance costs. Slip op. at 
2-3. 
 
Liberty also moved for summary judgment as to the 
issues of damages, interest, costs and fees. In afinal order 
dated February 26, 1997, and supplemental final order 
dated April 22, 1997, the district court granted Liberty's 
motion in part, awarding Liberty a total of approximately 
$800,000 in damages, attorneys' fees, costs and 
prejudgment interest. This appeal and cross appeal 
followed. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. The New Jersey Franchise Practices Act 
 
1. Statutory Language 
 
The New Jersey Franchise Practices Act provides that: 
 
       [i]f any motor vehicle franchise shall require or permit 
       motor vehicle franchisees to . . . provide parts in 
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       satisfaction of a warranty issued by the motor vehicle 
       franchisor . . . [t]he motor vehicle franchisor shall 
       reimburse each motor vehicle franchisee . . . for such 
       parts as are supplied, in an amount equal to the 
       prevailing retail price charged by such motor vehicle 
       franchisee for such . . . parts in circumstances where 
       . . . such parts [are] supplied other than pursuant to 
       the warranty; provided that such motor vehicle 
       franchisee's prevailing retail price is not unreasonable 
       when compared with that of [other franchisees] from 
       the same motor vehicle franchisor for identical 
       merchandise . . . in the geographic area in which the 
       motor vehicle franchisee is engaged in business . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-15(a). We must decide whether the 
district court erred in entering summary judgment in favor 
of Liberty on the grounds that Ford's "surcharge regime 
violates the clear language of the NJFPA." Slip op. at 11. 
We review both the district court's interpretation of the 
NJFPA and its entry of summary judgment de novo, 
construing the NJFPA as we believe that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would construe it and viewing the record in 
the light most favorable to Ford. See Pittston Co. Ultramar 
Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 516 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
While the New Jersey courts have not interpreted the 
relevant statutory language dictating that a "franchisor 
shall reimburse" its franchisee for warranty parts at "the 
prevailing retail price," under New Jersey law"[i]t is a 
cardinal rule of statutory construction that the language of 
the statute should be given its ordinary meaning and 
construed in a common sense manner to accomplish the 
legislative purpose." N.E.R.I. Corp. v. New Jersey Highway 
Auth., 686 A.2d 328, 335 (N.J. 1996) (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). Applying an ordinary and common 
sense definition of the relevant statutory language requiring 
Ford to reimburse Liberty at retail rates, we conclude that 
Ford's assessment of the DPS, which automatically reduced 
the reimbursements Liberty received to below retail levels, 
violated the plain language of the NJFPA. 
 
According to Ford, because the NJFPA regulates "a 
narrow aspect of the franchisor-franchisee relationship," 
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dictating only the rate of reimbursement for warranty parts, 
and "is silent regarding wholesale prices," the DPS which 
Ford added to Liberty's wholesale vehicle prices falls 
outside the purview of the NJFPA. Br. at 14-15. Ford 
contends that the district court, in finding that the DPS 
violated the NJFPA, "read into the statutory scheme a 
remarkably intrusive and completely unstated requirement 
that Ford silently bear the full cost of compliance," 
depriving Ford of "the freedom to control its wholesale 
pricing structure without . . . support in the language of 
the statute." Id. at 20. 
 
We disagree. The district court did not forbid Ford from 
adopting policies to recover the costs of complying with the 
NJFPA; nor did it forbid methods of cost recovery involving 
wholesale prices. The court simply held that while some 
"methods of cost-recovery are permissible . . . .[Ford's] 
method certainly is not." Slip op. at 9. Even though the 
court, in reaching this conclusion, did not delineate the 
distinctions between the DPS and permissible cost-recovery 
systems, those distinctions are apparent from the record 
before us. 
 
As Ford explained to Liberty in setting forth its method 
for calculating the DPS, "incremental [warranty 
reimbursement] costs incurred [by Ford] during each period 
. . . will be divided by the total number of vehicles invoiced 
. . . that month." App. at 321. Accordingly, the DPS bore no 
economic relationship to Liberty's wholesale vehicle 
purchases, but rather was exacted as an automatic result 
of, and in direct proportion to, Liberty's incremental 
warranty reimbursement claims. Although Ford described 
the DPS as a vehicle price surcharge and attributed a 
portion of it to each vehicle on Liberty's invoice, the total 
amount of the surcharge neither would increase if Liberty 
purchased more vehicles nor would decrease if Liberty 
purchased fewer. See id. at 308, 321. Thus, looking to the 
practical operation of the DPS rather than to the 
nomenclature Ford used to describe it, we conclude that 
the DPS, the amount of which depended solely and directly 
on Liberty's warranty reimbursement claims, functioned not 
as a wholesale vehicle price term carried out through 
unregulated vehicle sales transactions, but rather as a 
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warranty reimbursement policy that automatically 
eliminated any reimbursement beyond Ford's standard rate 
resulting, as Liberty argues, in "no payment at retail." Br. 
at 23. 
 
Because the DPS was assessed as an inevitable 
consequence of incremental reimbursement claims and not 
through separate, unregulated transactions, Ford's reliance 
on Acadia Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.3d 1050 (1st 
Cir. 1995), is misplaced. Acadia held that a Maine retail 
reimbursement statute similar to the NJFPA did not 
preclude Ford from imposing a wholesale vehicle price 
surcharge to recover the costs of reimbursing Maine dealers 
at retail rates rather than at Ford's standard rate. 3 The 
Acadia court found that "[n]othing in the[statutory] 
language . . . prohibits a manufacturer from increasing 
vehicle prices in order to recover its increased compliance 
costs. The statute says nothing about wholesale or retail 
prices, and apparently leaves the manufacturer free to 
increase wholesale prices." Id. at 1056. Thus, the Acadia 
court concluded, a restriction against wholesale price 
increases would improperly establish "a rule unsupported 
by state statute." Id. at 1057.4 
 
We agree with Acadia's holding that the statutes at issue 
do not preclude cost-recovery systems effected through 
wholesale vehicle price increases, but reject Ford's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Maine statute at issue in Acadia provides that: 
 
       [i]f a motor vehicle franchisor requires or permits a motor vehicle 
       franchisee to . . . provide parts in satisfaction of a warranty 
created 
       by the franchisor, the franchisor . . . shall reimburse the 
franchisee 
       for any parts so provided at the retail rate customarily charged by 
       that franchisee for the same parts when not provided in 
satisfaction 
       of a warranty. 
 
10 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, S 1176 (West 1994). 
 
4. In holding that the district court had fashioned a rule unsupported by 
the statutory language, Acadia admonished that "federal courts must 
take great caution when blazing new state-law trails." 44 F.3d at 1057 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). This principle, which we 
recognize as well, see Leo v. Kerr-McKee Chem. Corp., 37 F.3d 96, 101 
(3d Cir. 1994), is not implicated in this case where the district court 
properly applied the plain statutory language. 
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contention that the DPS constitutes such a system. 5 In 
Acadia, Ford reimbursed all Maine dealers at retail rates 
and assessed a "warranty parity surcharge" ("WPS") that 
added $160 to the price of every vehicle sold to Maine 
dealers "to recover [the] increase in its costs of doing 
business in Maine." 44 F.3d at 1052. The total amount of 
the surcharge imposed on each dealer was "based on the 
number of cars sold, without regard to whether the dealer 
actually performed warranty work in that month." Id. at 
1053. 
 
Thus, in contrast to the DPS, Ford did not impose 
the WPS as a consequence of a dealer's warranty 
reimbursement claims, but instead assessed it as a result 
of a separate vehicle purchase transaction. Because the 
total amount of charges a dealer would incur under the 
WPS scheme depended on the "number of cars sold" and 
not on the dealer's reimbursement amounts, the WPS 
operated as a bona fide wholesale price term that resulted 
from and accrued in proportion to unregulated vehicle sales 
transactions rather than regulated warranty reimbursement 
transactions. 
 
Contrary to Ford's assertion that "this factual difference 
. . . is completely irrelevant," reply br. at 11, we find the 
distinction to be critical. When a dealer incursfinancial 
burdens upon making a retail-rate warranty reimbursement 
claim, the dealer, in effect, is compensated for the warranty 
transaction at a below-retail rate, which the NJFPA forbids. 
When, however, the dealer incurs financial burdens as a 
result of other transactions, those burdens may reduce the 
return the dealer receives on those transactions, but the 
terms of those transactions are unregulated. Therefore the 
decreased compensation associated with those transactions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Where, as here, a New Jersey court has not construed the relevant 
statutory language, New Jersey courts seek guidance from cases 
construing similar statutes in other jurisdictions. See Neptune T.V. & 
Appliances Serv., Inc. v. Litton Microwave Cooking Prods. Div., 462 A.2d 
595, 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983). Acadia, 44 F.3d 1050, is the 
only such case of which we are aware. 
 
                                12 
  
does not violate the statute as does as a below-retail rate of 
compensation for installing warranty parts.6 
 
In light of these differences between the WPS at issue in 
Acadia and the DPS at issue in this case, Acadia's approval 
of the "chosen mechanism for cost recovery" in that case, 
44 F.3d at 1058, has little bearing on our examination of 
the decidedly different cost-recovery mechanism in this 
case. Because the DPS, unlike the WPS, did not function as 
a wholesale price increase effected through vehicle sales 
transactions beyond the regulatory reach of the NJFPA, we 
find Acadia inapposite and reject Ford's contention that 
Acadia compels us to find the cost-recovery method before 
us permissible under the NJFPA. Based upon the 
uncontroverted facts regarding the structure and operation 
of the DPS, we find that Ford's assessment of the DPS, by 
automatically reducing Liberty's reimbursements to below- 
retail rates, violates the NJFPA's clear mandate that the 
franchisor "shall reimburse" the franchisee for warranty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The distinction holds practical as well as statutory significance. 
Since 
a dealer, under the standard franchise agreement, must perform all 
warranty repairs brought to its dealership and cannot charge customers 
for those repairs but instead must accept the franchisor's standard 
reimbursement, the dealer cannot control the volume, timing or 
profitability of those repairs. Thus dealers cannot mitigate losses they 
may incur in performing warranty repairs by controlling the terms of 
those transactions as they can in their other operations. Because losses 
incurred in the context of warranty transactions impose these unique 
hardships on dealers, so do cost-recovery systems that assess charges as 
a result of and in proportion to those transactions. 
 
While Ford attempts to obscure this reality by arguing that a dealer 
can redistribute warranty transaction losses through its other 
operations, see reply br. at 11 & n.2, this argument ignores the fact that 
a dealer neither can predict nor can control the proportion of its 
operations it will be required to devote to performing mandatory 
warranty repairs, and thus could recover fluctuating warranty losses 
only by constantly readjusting retail prices, which would be economically 
infeasible. Thus, a rule protecting dealers fromfinancial burdens 
incurred through warranty transactions but not through other 
transactions not only comports with the statutory scheme dictating the 
terms only of the former, but also recognizes the unique hardships 
associated with warranty losses due to the dealer's lack of control over 
the terms of warranty transactions. 
 
                                13 
  
parts "in an amount equal to the prevailing retail price." 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-15(a).7 
 
In arguing that its DPS scheme comports with the 
NJFPA, Ford essentially argues that to achieve compliance 
with the retail reimbursement mandate, a franchisor only 
need record a nominal retail-rate credit to the dealer, even 
if an offsetting debit ensures that the dealer never receives 
any reimbursement at the retail rate. Ford's definition of 
statutory compliance would require us to view its initial 
retail-rate reimbursement in isolation from the surcharge 
that inevitably offsets that reimbursement, contrary to the 
undisputed evidence that the offset followed ineluctably 
from the incremental reimbursement and relegated Liberty 
to the same position as if it initially had received only the 
standard reimbursement.8 
 
Ford's strained construction of the NJFPA, which the 
district court properly rejected as "formalistic, in the 
extreme," slip op. at 9, would ascribe paramount 
importance to illusory transactions recorded on a dealer's 
invoice while ignoring the reality of whether the franchisor 
actually reimbursed its franchisee "in an amount equal to 
the prevailing retail price" as the statute requires. Because 
a statute permitting illusory transactions with no economic 
effect would serve no legislative purpose, we find no 
indication that the New Jersey Supreme Court would adopt 
Ford's construction of the NJFPA contrary to that court's 
pronouncement that statutes be construed in "a common 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Because the surcharge in this case resulted automatically from 
Liberty's incremental reimbursement claims and because the total 
amount of the surcharge depended directly on the amount of those 
claims, we need not decide the legality under the NJFPA of cost-recovery 
methods that depend on a dealer's reimbursement transactions in some 
less direct manner. 
 
8. Indeed, in maintaining that the surcharge achieved "parity" between 
Liberty and competitors who received only standard reimbursements, 
Ford effectively recognizes that the DPS consigned Liberty to the same 
position as dealers who were reimbursed at Ford's rates which were 
statutorily deficient as to Liberty. See app. at 321 ("[P]arity between 
dealers . . . is essential. . . . To maintain that parity . . . and to 
recover 
our increased costs . . . the Costs will be recovered [through] a dealer 
parity surcharge."). 
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sense manner to accomplish the legislative purpose." 
N.E.R.I Corp., 686 A.2d at 335. In fact, we are quite 
confident that that court would reject Ford's NJFPA 
argument. 
 
Construing the statutory terms according to their plain 
and ordinary meaning as is required under New Jersey law, 
see Service Armament Co. v. Hyland, 362 A.2d 13, 16 (N.J. 
1976); Cutler v. Borough of Westwood, 685 A.2d 44, 47 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 693 A.2d 
112 (N.J. 1997), we conclude that the term "reimburse," 
which is defined as "[t]o pay back, to make restoration, to 
repay that expended; to indemnify, or make whole," BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (6th ed. 1990), is not satisfied by 
transactions that fail to result in actual payment or 
restoration of the requisite sums. Accordingly we, like the 
district court, hold that in reducing Liberty to"the same 
position as if it were reimbursed the standard thirty to forty 
percent above cost," slip op. at 10, the DPS scheme violated 
"the clear language of the NJFPA" by denying Liberty 
reimbursement at its prevailing retail rate. Id. at 11. 
 
2. Legislative Purpose 
 
Because the district court properly construed the NJFPA 
"as it is written [and] . . . not according to some 
unexpressed intention," Unsatisfied Claim & Judgment 
Fund Bd. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 191, 193 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), aff'd, 649 A.2d 1243 (N.J. 
1994), we find no merit in Ford's contention that the 
district court erred by relying on legislative history to 
expand the NJFPA beyond the scope of its plain statutory 
language. See br. at 16. The legislative history, however, 
clearly does support a statutory interpretation that 
prohibits spurious transactions which ultimately fail to 
result in reimbursement at the dealer's retail rate. 
 
The New Jersey courts have held that the NJFPA is a 
remedial statute intended to equalize the disparity of 
bargaining power in franchisor-franchisee relations. See 
Kubis & Perszyk Assocs., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 
A.2d 618, 626 (N.J. 1996) (recognizing NJFPA's "basic 
legislative objectives of protecting franchisees from the 
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superior bargaining power of franschisors"); Tynan v. 
General Motors Corp., 604 A.2d 99, 100 (N.J. 1992) 
(adopting reasoning of dissent below stating that"[t]he 
Franchise Practices Act is remedial in purpose [and] 
focuses on the need to protect franchisees from inequitable 
treatment by economically more powerful franchisors") 
(citing Tynan v. General Motors Corp., 591 A.2d 1024, 1035 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (Cohen, J., dissenting in 
part)); Westfield Ctr. Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 432 
A.2d 48, 52-54 (N.J. 1981) (discussing "disparity in . . . 
bargaining power" addressed in NJFPA).9  Under New Jersey 
law, remedial statutes must be construed broadly to give 
effect to their legislative purpose. See Lemelledo v. 
Beneficial Management Corp., 674 A.2d 582, 585 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), aff'd, 696 A.2d 546 (N.J. 1997); 
Sabella v. Lacey Township, 497 A.2d 896, 898 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1985). 
 
The motor vehicle franchise provisions at issue, which 
the legislature added to the NJFPA in 1977, were "designed 
to remove the franchisor's present opportunity to isolate 
himself from the warranty he issues." Legislative Statement, 
L. 1977, c. 84, S 3, Assembly No. 1956 (May 24, 1976) 
("Legis. Statement"). In enacting the retail reimbursement 
requirement, the New Jersey legislature expressed its intent 
to "offer[ ] protection to the competent retailer against 
arbitrary actions by manufacturers who too often hold a 
life-and-death power over his business and his ability to 
serve his customers." Id. In light of these statements 
indicating an intent to shift responsibility toward 
franchisors who issue warranties and to protect dealers in 
their transactions with franchisors, we agree with the 
district court that a construction of the NJFPA permitting 
machinations which ultimately fail to afford the dealer 
reimbursement for warranty parts at its retail rate would 
"fly in the face of the intent of the New Jersey legislature 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In a 1989 amendment to the NJFPA adopted after the 1977 provision 
at issue, the New Jersey legislature explicitly codified its concern over 
the "inequality of bargaining power . . . between motor vehicle 
franchisors and motor vehicle franchisees." See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10- 
7.2(b). 
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. . . and would undermine the purpose of the Act." Slip op. 
at 11. 
 
Ford attempts to diminish the significance of the 
 851<!>legislative history by arguing that the New Jersey 
 
legislature identified several consumer protection concerns 
before expressing its intent to protect dealers. See reply br. 
at 6 (citing Legis. Statement). The legislature, however, did 
not indicate the relative importance of these concerns. We 
therefore find no relevance in the order in which the 
legislature articulated them. In any event, the stated 
consumer protection concerns of ensuring that warranty 
customers receive the same service as retail customers and 
that warranty work be performed according to generally 
acceptable standards, see Legis. Statement, are aligned 
closely with the intent to protect dealers from arbitrary 
actions by franchisors. Dealers who receive below-retail 
compensation for installing warranty parts are discouraged 
from devoting the same resources to installing those parts 
as they devote to installing those for retail customers.10 
Thus, the consumer protection concerns behind the NJFPA 
further support a statutory interpretation which focuses on 
the compensation rate the dealer effectively receives in 
connection with its warranty transactions and not on 
whether the franchisor recorded a nominal transaction 
crediting the dealer at the requisite rate. 
 
Ford also argues that the district court erred in 
concluding that, "[a]lthough the Act is silent regarding 
whether and how franchisor-manufacturers may distribute 
compliance costs, it cannot be the case that the franchisee- 
dealers--the class of intended beneficiaries--bear the entire 
burden." Slip op. at 11. According to Ford, the district court 
erred in reaching this conclusion as to the intended effect 
of the NJFPA, since regulated entities frequently pass 
statutory compliance costs along to retailers who do not 
then "bear the entire burden" of those costs, but rather 
pass those costs on to consumers. See br. at 18-19; 20-21. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Because the reimbursement rate for the labor associated with 
warranty repairs is not at issue, we assume equal rates for the labor 
used in warranty and non-warranty repairs. 
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We are unpersuaded by this argument, which ignores the 
fact that the purported "compliance costs" which Ford 
shifted to Liberty were not incidental to compliance with an 
independent regulatory mandate, such as a vehicle safety 
standard or an environmental regulation, but rather were 
the very subject of the substantive regulation at issue, 
which explicitly mandates that "the motor vehicle franchisor 
shall reimburse" its franchisee at the "prevailing retail 
price." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-15(a) (emphasis added). 
 
In contending that it may shift to Liberty the cost of 
complying with that mandate, Ford essentially insists that 
it can achieve statutory compliance by requiring Liberty to 
reimburse itself.11 This shifting of the retail cost of warranty 
parts not only violates the clear mandate that Ford as the 
franchisor pay Liberty the retail price for warranty parts, 
but also frustrates the purpose behind a statute that was 
intended to deny the franchisor the "opportunity to isolate 
himself from the warranty he issues," to protect dealers 
against "arbitrary actions by manufacturers," and to ensure 
that warranty repairs are of the same quality as retail 
repairs. Legis. Statement. Accordingly, we agree with the 
district court's conclusion that Ford's imposition of the DPS 
contravened the legislative purpose as well as the clear 
statutory language of the NJFPA. We, therefore, will affirm 
the March 13, 1996 order granting Liberty's motion for 
summary judgment on its NJFPA claim. 
 
B. The September 19, 1996 Order 
 
After the district court entered its March 13, 1996 order 
holding that the DPS violated the NJFPA, Ford ceased 
imposing the DPS, but adopted a new policy requiring 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Since the DPS deprived Liberty of the reimbursement which Ford 
statutorily was obligated to pay, the issue of whether Liberty, as Ford 
argues, effectively could recover the losses resulting from this 
deprivation 
through other transactions becomes immaterial. See br. at 18-21. We 
note, however, that in light of the difficulties inherent in 
redistributing 
warranty losses through retail transactions, see supra note 6, the 
district 
court appears to have been correct in finding that dealers ultimately 
would bear a significant portion of the costs shifted to them through the 
DPS. See slip op. at 8. 
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dealers to document claimed retail rates by submitting 
proof of the prices the dealer charged actual retail 
customers for the same part during the prior six months. 
See app. at 513-17. After Ford rejected Liberty's 
reimbursement claims for failure to comply with this 
requirement, Liberty objected to the requirement in a 
Motion to Enforce the district court's March order, which 
alleged that Ford's new policy imposed insurmountable 
burdens designed to preclude dealers from receiving retail- 
rate reimbursements. See id. at 498-500. Ford responded 
that it adopted its policy in a good faith attempt to comply 
with the "part-by-part, sale-by-sale" retail rate analysis set 
forth in Liberty I, 149 F.R.D. at 76, and sought discovery as 
to how burdensome other dealers found the policy and as 
to the methods other franchisors used to determine their 
dealers' retail rates, in order to refute Liberty's allegations 
that Ford's policies were excessively burdensome. See app. 
at 729-30. 
 
Although the district court denied Liberty's Motion to 
Enforce "given the non-specific language of the March 13, 
1996 order," slip op. at 1, it entered an order"nunc pro tunc 
to March 13, 1996" requiring Ford to adhere to the 
"procedure the parties followed . . . until . . . April 1996, 
i.e., reimbursement . . . at [Liberty's] retail rate, calculated 
. . . at 77% over [Liberty's] cost." Id. at 2-3. The court 
ordered Ford to continue processing Liberty's 
reimbursement claims based on a 77% markup "unless and 
until the parties agree that a retail rate, calculated at a 
later date, is more accurate, another mutually acceptable 
computation of the retail rate is agreed upon, or, as long as 
this court retains jurisdiction, on a showing by[Ford] that 
the procedure should be changed." Id.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The impact of this order is significant. Ford disputed whether 
Liberty's claimed 77% markup was reasonable, see app. at 321, but had 
no reason to pursue the issue in light of the DPS, which reduced 
Liberty's reimbursements to Ford's standard 30-40% markup, rendering 
the claimed retail rate irrelevant. However, after the court invalidated 
the 
DPS the retail rate became determinative of the required reimbursement 
amount. Yet the court, in its September order, bound Ford to the 77% 
rate Ford had accepted under protest and precluded Ford from adopting 
any method for questioning or substantiating that rate. 
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Ford contends that the district court erred in restricting 
Ford's new reimbursement policy, the legality of which 
neither was challenged in Liberty's complaint nor was 
addressed in the district court's prior order, without 
providing Ford an adequate opportunity to address the 
factual and legal issues surrounding the policy. We agree, 
and therefore will reverse the September 19, 1996 order. 
 
The district court did not explain the procedural grounds 
upon which it proceeded to award relief restricting Ford's 
policy, after denying the only motion contesting that policy.13 
While it is unclear whether the district court intended the 
order as a sanction for what it perceived as an "end run 
around the clear intention of" the March order, slip op. at 
1-2, or as an entry of judgment on Liberty's allegation that 
Ford's newly adopted policy violated the NJFPA, we 
conclude that we cannot sustain the order on either basis. 
 
We cannot sustain the September order as a sanction for 
noncompliance with the court's March order because the 
policy which the court restricted in the September order did 
not violate any clear mandate set forth in the March order. 
The district court in fact denied Liberty's Motion to Enforce 
the March order "given the non-specific language" thereof, 
and thus recognized that the March order, in invalidating 
the DPS as an offset against a dealer's claimed retail rate, 
did not preclude Ford from requiring a dealer to 
substantiate its claimed retail rate. Slip op. at 1. 14 This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Liberty's complaint, which challenged the imposition of the DPS to 
offset its retail rate, is silent as to the proper method for establishing 
the 
retail rate. While the complaint sought an injunction against any 
"financial imposition . . . as a recoupment . . . for reimbursements paid 
or to be paid," it did not seek any relief dictating Liberty's retail rate 
or 
the procedure used to establish it. See app. at 19-20. The district 
court's 
March order is equally silent regarding the proper calculation of 
Liberty's 
retail rate. 
 
14. In discussing the scope of its March order, the district court 
explained, 
 
       the specific declarations as to liability which[Liberty] sought in 
       Count One, while implicit in [the March] order granting summary 
       judgment as to Count One, were not explicit, presumably the reason 
       why the spirit if not the letter of that order -- and certain 
specific 
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court repeatedly has refused to uphold orders entered as 
sanctions based on conduct that did not violate a clear, 
specific mandate. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 
47 F.3d 1342, 1352 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing imposition of 
sanctions where decree sought to be enforced lacked"an 
unambiguous provision" prohibiting the conduct at issue); 
Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 
762, 771 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that "[b]road, non-specific 
language" in an order does not give a party "fair notice of 
what conduct will risk contempt" and thus cannot support 
imposition of sanctions); Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald 
v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that 
where party had "reasonable grounds to believe" conduct 
"was in compliance with the district court's order," 
"imposition of sanctions was not warranted and constituted 
an abuse of discretion"); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. 
Wecht, 754 F.2d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Persons may not 
be placed at risk of contempt unless they have been given 
specific notice of the norm to which they must pattern their 
conduct."). Because the March order did not contain a 
clear, specific mandate precluding Ford from adopting 
policies for verifying a dealer's retail rate or requiring Ford 
to apply a particular retail rate, we cannot sustain the 
September order as a sanction against Ford's purported 
"end run around the clear intention of" the March order. 
Slip op. at 2. 
 
Nor can we sustain the September order as an entry of 
judgment on Liberty's claim, first raised in its Motion to 
Enforce, that Ford's new policy violated the NJFPA. A court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       language in and the clear thrust of the opinion-- have since been 
       ignored or evaded by [Ford]. 
 
Slip op. at 1. The district court did not and this court cannot identify 
any "specific language" in the March opinion that was "ignored or 
evaded" by Ford's new reimbursement policy. Even if the declarations of 
liability Liberty sought in Count I had been "explicit" in the March 
order, 
those declarations dealt exclusively with surcharges that offset retail 
rates and not with procedures for establishing retail rates. See app. at 
18-19. Nothing in the March order explicitly or implicitly required Ford 
to accept Liberty's claimed retail rate of 77% or prohibited Ford from 
adopting policies for substantiating dealers' retail rates. 
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may enter summary judgment in favor of a party only when 
the pleadings and the factual record before the court 
demonstrate that there "is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact" and the party is "entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In applying these 
standards, the court must construe the facts in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom judgment is 
sought. See Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank New 
Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). Moreover, before 
entering summary judgment against a party, the court 
must afford that party "adequate notice and time to present 
to the district court material relevant to [its] claim in order 
to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
that renders summary disposition . . . inappropriate." 
Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 578 (3d Cir. 1996). The 
court also must provide an adequate opportunity for 
discovery of the material facts. See Kachmar v. Sungard 
Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
In this case the district court entered a judgment 
awarding relief against Ford without granting it an 
opportunity to obtain discovery or present evidence 
regarding the material issues as to the nature of the new 
reimbursement procedure, the burdens associated 
therewith, and the intent underlying its adoption. While the 
district court made no explicit factual findings and 
disavowed any attempt to resolve these factual issues, 
stating that it "need not . . . and will not address the 
procedure imposed by Ford . . . following this court's 
[March] decision," slip op. at 3 n.2, the court, nonetheless, 
clearly based the September order on implicit factual 
determinations regarding the newly adopted procedure. 
 
The court described that procedure as "onerous in the 
extreme and designed to frustrate any attempt to obtain 
statutory reimbursement." Id. Moreover, the court's final 
order described the circumstances of the September order 
as follows: 
 
        Liberty filed a motion to enforce the March[order] 
       arguing that [Ford's] new procedure acted as an 
       unlawful barrier to Ford's statutory compliance . . . 
       [through] an impracticable or impossible procedure 
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       that violates the NJFPA and this court's previous 
       Opinion and Order. 
 
        This court agreed. The new procedure . . . imposed a 
       literally impossible burden . . . . 
 
February 26, 1997 slip op. at 4. The court's final order thus 
confirms that the September order rested on implicit 
findings that Ford's new policy imposed "impossible" and 
unlawful burdens, id. at 4, that were intended "as nothing 
more and nothing less than an end-run around" the March 
order. Id. at 12. Because the court made these findings 
regarding Ford's newly adopted policy and awarded Liberty 
relief based upon those findings without allowing Ford to 
obtain discovery or demonstrate the existence of genuine 
issues of material fact as to the lawfulness of the policy, we 
must vacate the September order. See Kachmar, 109 F.3d 
at 183; Hilfirty, 91 F.3d at 578.15 
 
The September 19 order awarded only declaratory and 
injunctive relief. Accordingly, as Ford concedes, see br. at 
34, our reversing that order has no effect on the award of 
damages in the district court's final order. It, however, may 
affect the district court's assessment of the "result 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. While our holding rests on the grounds discussed above, we also 
note that Liberty was awarded judgment on a claim not raised in the 
complaint. See Morris v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 1996 WL 167615 at 
* 4 (E.D. Pa.) ("plaintiff may not move for summary judgment on claims 
not raised in the complaint"), aff'd, 106 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 1996) (table); 
Landano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 873 F. Supp. 884, 891 (D.N.J. 
1994) ("Plaintiff did not allege [the] claim in its complaint and cannot 
raise [it] on a . . . motion for summary judgment."). The September order 
awarded declaratory and injunctive relief other than that discussed 
above. However, absent a properly supported determination that Ford 
had violated the NJFPA or an order of the court since the entry of the 
March order, we cannot sustain any of the relief awarded in the 
September order. 
 
In reversing the September order on procedural grounds, we express 
no opinion on the merits of the issues implicitly resolved therein. We 
note only that the existence of colorable authority for requiring dealers 
to establish retail rates on a part-by-part basis, see Acadia, 44 F.3d at 
1052; Liberty I, 149 F.R.D. at 76, further accentuates the need to assess 
the lawfulness of Ford's documentation policy based on a properly 
developed record. 
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obtained" by Liberty in this litigation, which the court 
considered in calculating the award of attorneys' fees in its 
final order. See February 26, 1997 slip op. at 10. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the fee award and will remand 
that portion of the district court's February 26, 1997 final 
order for consideration of the effect, if any, of this opinion 
on the amount of fees Liberty is entitled to recover. 
 
C. Robinson-Patman Act 
 
The Robinson-Patman Act, a 1936 amendment to the 
Clayton Act, provides in relevant part that: 
 
       [i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
       commerce, in the course of such commerce . . . to 
       discriminate in price between different purchasers of 
       commodities of like grade and quality, . . . where the 
       effect of such discrimination may be substantially to 
       lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly . . . or 
       to injure, destroy, or prevent competition . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 13(a).16 To state a claim under the Robinson- 
Patman Act, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the 
existence of price discrimination, which the Supreme Court 
has defined as "merely a price difference." Texaco Inc. v. 
Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 558, 110 S.Ct. 2535, 2544 
(1990); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 
U.S. 536, 549, 80 S.Ct. 1267, 1274 (1960).17 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The Act contains a proviso exempting "price differentials which make 
only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or 
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such 
commodities are . . . sold or delivered." 15 U.S.C. S 13(a). Because we 
conclude that Ford did not engage in price discrimination or inflict 
competitive injury within the meaning of the Act, we need not consider 
the applicability of the proviso. 
 
17. Anheuser-Busch was a primary line injury case addressing injury to 
the discriminating seller's competitors, in contrast to this secondary 
line 
injury case, which alleges injury in competition among the 
discriminating seller's customers. See Barr Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 
978 F.2d 98, 106 n.16 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing distinction between 
primary and secondary line injury cases). While Anheuser-Busch's broad 
definition of price discrimination generally is applicable in secondary 
line 
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The district court dismissed Liberty's claim on the 
grounds that its allegations challenging the DPS as a form 
of unlawful price discrimination "fail[ ] to demonstrate the 
existence of a price difference." Slip op. at 12. The court 
explained that: 
 
       while it is true that no other . . . dealer was or is 
       subject to a surcharge, this is because no other dealer 
       attempted to enforce the NJFPA. [Liberty] is being 
       reimbursed for warranty parts at seventy-seven percent 
       above cost at the same time that [its] competitors are 
       being reimbursed the standard thirty to forty percent 
       above cost. The surcharge was merely a device to 
       recoup the extra costs [Ford] incurred by reimbursing 
       [Liberty] at the retail rate. 
 
        Thus, the surcharge eliminated any price difference 
       that existed by virtue of [Liberty's] enforcement of the 
       NJFPA . . . . [Liberty] was placed in the same position 
       as its competitors: all dealers were effectively 
       reimbursed at the standard rate, albeit in violation of 
       the NJFPA. Thus, there was no price difference. 
 
Id. at 12-13. Exercising plenary review over the district 
court's dismissal for failure to state a claim and accepting 
Liberty's factual allegations as true, see Graves v. Lowery, 
117 F.3d 723, 726 (3d Cir. 1997), we agree with the district 
court's conclusion that Liberty's complaint fails to allege 
actionable price discrimination.18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
injury cases, see Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 63 
F.3d 1267, 1271 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1264 (1996), this 
court has warned "against elevating this isolated passage to an all- 
inclusive definition" particularly in secondary line injury cases. Edward 
J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 120 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
 
18. Because the district court disposed of Liberty's Robinson-Patman Act 
claim on Ford's motion to dismiss, we confine our analysis to Liberty's 
allegations and do not consider matters outside the pleadings. We note, 
however, that the evidentiary record regarding the operation of the DPS, 
as discussed above in our analysis of the NJFPA issues resolved on a 
motion for summary judgment, lends further support to our conclusion 
that the DPS did not result in actionable price discrimination. 
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According to Liberty's own factual allegations, 
 
       Ford would . . . recoup the increase in reimbursement 
       [beyond Ford's standard rate] by assessing against 
       Liberty . . . a `dealer parity' . . . surcharge to the 
       wholesale price of each vehicle . . . equal to the 
       incremental credit for parts; that is, Ford would 
       effectively cancel out the additional reimbursement . . . . 
       [and] effectually continues to underreimburse Liberty 
       . . . for warranty work . . . . 
 
App. at 17-18 (emphasis added). Thus, the facts alleged in 
the complaint demonstrate that Ford used wholesale 
vehicle prices as a method for implementing the DPS policy, 
the intent and effect of which was to reduce Liberty's 
reimbursements, not to alter vehicle prices.19 Because the 
complaint fails to allege any facts demonstrating an actual 
increase in vehicle prices, we agree with the district court's 
conclusion that, "[a]lthough these actions violate the 
NJFPA, they do not create a price difference among[Liberty] 
and its competitors which violates . . . the Robinson- 
Patman Act." Id. at 13. We therefore will affirm the 
dismissal of Liberty's claim for failure to allege facts 
demonstrating that Ford engaged in price discrimination.20 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Similarly, Liberty states in its brief to this court, "Ford applied 
the 
surcharge to the wholesale price of each vehicle [and] thus canceled out 
the incremental reimbursement. . . . Once this shell-game maneuver was 
complete, Liberty did not receive retail reimbursement . . . ." Br. at 15- 
16; see also id. at 23 ("the `parity surcharge' meant no [warranty parts] 
payment at retail"); id. at 38 ("[t]he price differential . . . is 
expressly a 
recoupment of the incremental warranty reimbursement"). 
 
20. Assuming arguendo that the surcharge could be viewed as a term 
affecting vehicle costs rather than reimbursement rates, a "uniform 
pricing formula applicable to all customers is not a price discrimination 
under the [Robinson-Patman] act." Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. 
Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 120 (3d Cir. 1980); accord, FLM Collision 
Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019, 1026 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding 
"no violation . . . in pricing plans which, though varying prices 
according 
to different terms of sale, were administered equally to all purchasers"). 
Ford's policy was to recoup through the DPS any reimbursement 
exceeding Ford's standard rate. The fact that Liberty, as the only dealer 
to claim incremental reimbursements, was the only dealer to incur 
charges under this uniform policy does not give rise to a price 
discrimination claim. 
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Even if the DPS resulted in a vehicle price difference, we 
would be compelled to affirm the dismissal on the grounds 
that Liberty's allegations do not demonstrate the existence 
of the competitive injury required to sustain a Robinson- 
Patman Act claim. As this court has explained, "price 
discriminations are not illegal per se. . . . [I]n order for a 
price difference to be illegal . . . [it] must have the 
proscribed anti-competitive effect." J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv- 
a-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1532 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Anheuser-Busch, 363 U.S. at 533, 80 S.Ct. at 1276). 
Liberty's complaint did not allege competitive injury 
resulting from the imposition of the DPS. See  app. at 24. 
While Liberty alleged "economic loss . . . as a consequence 
of . . . underreimbursement," it did not allege that this loss 
placed it at a disadvantage relative to its competitors who 
were subjected to the same underreimbursement. Id. at 18. 
In arguing to this court that the DPS inflicted competitive 
injury because it was "exacted from Liberty and none of its 
competitors," br. at 38, Liberty ignores the fact that, 
according to its complaint, the DPS was calibrated to "equal 
. . . the incremental credit" that Liberty received while its 
competitors did not. App. at 18.21 Because any 
disadvantage arising from the DPS merely offset an 
advantage conferred uniquely on Liberty, the DPS did not 
have the anticompetitive effect required to state a claim 
under the Robinson-Patman Act. See J.F. Feeser, 909 F.2d 
at 1532. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Liberty suggests, in passing, that the surcharge "could exceed the 
warranty parts reimbursement at any given time." Reply br. at 6. The 
district court properly rejected any attempt to base a price 
discrimination claim on discrepancies between the amount of the 
incremental reimbursement and the amount of the surcharge, as these 
discrepancies related only "to particular surcharges" and not to "the 
structure of the surcharge system," slip op. at 13 n.2, which by Liberty's 
own admission assessed charges that equaled the total incremental 
reimbursements. See app. at 18. Thus any difference in Liberty's 
economic position relative to its competitors was temporary and 
incidental and therefore not actionable under the Robinson-Patman Act. 
See Craig v. Sun Oil Co., 515 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1975) (rejecting 
price discrimination claim "based upon . . . billing errors . . . which 
were 
corrected"). 
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D. Parts Installed Before December 1991 
 
In its motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
 704<!>damages, Liberty sought to recover not only the 
 
incremental reimbursements it was denied as a result of 
the surcharge, but also additional reimbursements for 
warranty parts installed before December 12, 1991, the 
effective date of Ford's agreement to credit Liberty at retail 
rates subject to the surcharge. Citing Ford's warranty 
manual, which permits dealers to submit reimbursement 
claims for up to one year after a warranty part is installed, 
Liberty argued that because it demanded retail-rate 
reimbursements on December 12, 1991, it was entitled to 
additional reimbursements to supplement the standard 
reimbursements it had received for parts installed during 
the year preceding December 12, 1991. See February 26, 
1997 slip op. at 6. 
 
The district court held that, "[t]his legal issue was never 
addressed during the liability phase of this case because 
Liberty explicitly waived all claims other than its claim for 
illegal surcharge since December 12, 1991." Id. at 7. The 
district court cited Liberty's brief regarding liability, in 
which Liberty expressly stated that it "claim[ed] liability 
only on the reimbursement amounts recovered by Ford by 
illegal surcharge since December 1991." Thus, the court 
concluded, "[b]ecause the court did not grant summary 
judgment as to liability on this issue, it cannot now award 
damages." Id. 
 
Liberty's briefs to this court do not challenge the waiver 
determination that the district court found dispositive, but 
rather address only the merits of Liberty's entitlement to 
additional reimbursements for parts installed before 
December 12, 1991.22 The district court's order entering 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Liberty addresses the waiver issue only by stating that "Ford's 
liability for retail payment on claims submitted since December 12, 1991 
was never waived. It is recognized in the Court's Orders and decisions, 
with the exception of the final ruling on . . . damages." Reply br. at 12 
(emphasis added). The district court's orders did not "recognize" any 
liability as to warranty parts installed before December 12, 1991. In the 
portion of Liberty's brief asserting that it preserved the issue in the 
district court, Liberty states only that it raised the issue "as to 
damages" 
and does not cite any part of the record where it sought to establish 
Ford's liability for the reimbursements at issue. See br. at xiv. 
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judgment as to Ford's liability under the NJFPA explicitly 
stated, "[f]or the reasons stated herein, the court grants 
[Liberty's] motion for summary judgment as to liability, 
since December, 1991 only." Slip op. at 14. We therefore 
conclude that the district court properly refused to award 
damages on this claim which Liberty failed to raise at the 
liability stage of the proceedings. 
 
Even if Liberty had not waived the issue, undisputed 
evidence demonstrates that Ford is not liable for any 
additional reimbursements for parts installed before 
December 1991. Liberty claims that it is entitled to 
additional reimbursements for parts installed between 
December 12, 1990, and December 12, 1991, because the 
relevant warranty agreement permitted dealers to submit 
reimbursement claims within one year from the date of 
repair. See app. at 139 ("After 1 year from date of repair . . . 
[w]arranty . . . claims will not be accepted."). Liberty 
contends that, because Ford first agreed to reimburse 
Liberty at retail as of December 12, 1991, Ford is obligated 
to pay Liberty the incremental reimbursement for all 
warranty parts Liberty installed after December 12, 1990, 
to supplement the below-retail reimbursements Liberty 
received for installing those parts. Br. at 40-41. 
 
However, contrary to Liberty's assertion that it 
"submitted incremental reimbursement claims" on 
December 12, 1991, id., the letter of that date merely 
requested an increase in Liberty's reimbursement rate and 
did not submit any specific reimbursement claims or make 
reference to any parts already installed and reimbursed at 
a lower rate. See app. at 286 ("I hereby apply for an 
increase in warranty parts markup . . . to my retail 
markup."). Liberty first made specific retail-rate 
reimbursement claims "for the period of December 12, 1991 
to June 30, 1992," in a letter dated September 23, 1992, 
again making no reference to parts installed before 
December 12, 1991. App. at 316-17. It was not until 
December 21, 1992, that Liberty first submitted a request 
for retail-rate reimbursement for parts installed before 
December 12, 1991. This request included parts installed 
during "the years 1986 through 1991 inclusive." App. at 
326. 
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Thus, Liberty did not seek the additional reimbursements 
at issue until December 21, 1992. As Ford accurately 
contends, pursuant to the warranty manual Liberty's 
claims "were time-barred on the date they were made" as 
they pertained to repairs performed before December 21, 
1991. Reply br. at 30.23 Because Liberty failed to seek the 
reimbursements at issue within one year of the repair date, 
it is immaterial that Liberty sought a higher reimbursement 
rate on December 12, 1991, in a request that did not 
present any specific reimbursement claims.24 Similarly, it is 
immaterial that "[a]s of December 12, 1991, all of Liberty's 
claims back one year from [the] date of repair were eligible 
for the incremental warranty payment," reply br. at 13, 
since Liberty failed to submit those claims before that 
eligibility expired on December 12, 1992. Accordingly, even 
if Liberty had not waived its claim to recover additional 
reimbursements for parts installed before December 12, 
1991, we would affirm the district court's rejection of that 
claim. 
 
E. Prejudgment Interest Rate 
 
In its February 26, 1997 final order the district court, 
applying the principles of state law that govern awards of 
prejudgment interest in federal diversity actions, see 
Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401, 1414 (3d 
Cir. 1985); W.A. Wright, Inc. v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 746 
F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1984), awarded Liberty prejudgment 
interest on its NJFPA damages at the rates set forth in New 
Jersey Court Rule 4:42-11. Slip op. at 8-9. Under New 
Jersey law, a court may award prejudgment interest in its 
discretion in accordance with equitable principles, and the 
court's exercise of its discretion should not be disturbed on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. Liberty did not distinguish the 1991 claims from the even more 
untimely claims dating back to 1986. 
 
24. While Liberty argues that "for the most part" the claims at issue were 
"already submitted and approved" at Ford's standard rate, reply br. at 
13, Liberty makes no argument to support its apparent suggestion that 
claims for additional reimbursements are exempt from the one-year 
limitation period that on its face applies to all warranty reimbursement 
claims. See app. at 139. 
 
                                30 
  
appeal unless it represents "a manifest denial of justice." In 
re Petition of County of Essex, 691 A.2d 846, 858 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 700 A.2d 876 (N.J. 
1997); accord Coastal Group, Inc. v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 643 
A.2d 649, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
 
The district court found that, "because Ford has had the 
use, and Liberty has not, of the funds retained by Ford by 
way of illegal surcharges," Liberty was entitled to interest 
on the surcharges from December 1991 through March 
1996. The court concluded that New Jersey Court Rule 
4:42-11, which sets forth postjudgment interest rates and 
prejudgment interest rates in tort suits, "reflect[ed] an 
equitable rate of return" under the circumstances of the 
case. See slip op. at 8-9 (citing Zippertubing Co., 757 F.2d 
at 1414; W.A. Wright, Inc., 746 F.2d at 219). Liberty 
contends that the district court abused its discretion in 
applying the New Jersey Court Rules instead of adopting 
the involuntary loan theory recognized in A-S Dev., Inc. v. 
W.R. Grace Land Corp., 537 F. Supp. 549 (D.N.J. 1982), 
aff'd, 707 F.2d 1388 (3d Cir. 1983) (table). Liberty argues 
that under this theory, the district court should have 
applied the interest rate Ford would have charged Liberty 
for late payments or loans during the same period. See br. 
at 41. 
 
In arguing that the involuntary loan theory is 
"particularly appropriate" since Liberty "partially 
underwrote Ford's coverage of its manufacturing defects," 
id. at 41, 43, Liberty ignores the fact that A-S Development 
applied the involuntary loan theory as an element of 
damages and not as a measure of prejudgment interest. See 
A-S Dev., 537 F. Supp. at 559 (holding that"plaintiff is 
entitled to damages in an amount to be calculated on the 
involuntary loan theory"). Liberty points to nothing 
requiring the district court, in its discretionary weighing of 
equitable considerations, to adopt this theory and nothing 
indicating that the interest rates set forth in the New Jersey 
Court Rules were inequitable under the circumstances of 
the case.25 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Liberty emphasizes that the award of prejudgment interest must be 
determined by "equitable principles," reply br. at 14-15, but raises no 
arguments and cites no authority indicating that the district court 
misapplied these principles. 
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Liberty also challenges the district court's conclusion that 
"[b]ecause Liberty has asserted its claim under N.J.S.A. 
56:10-10 and 56:10-15, it is not entitled to prejudgment 
interest at 12% under N.J.S.A. 56:10-13.5, which applies 
only to claims under that section." Slip op. at 9 n.3. Liberty 
argues that "this Court could properly apply" N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 56:10-13.5, br. at 42, which provides that, 
 
       [i]f a motor vehicle franchisor fails to make any 
       payment required by this 1991 amendatory and 
       supplementary act within the time specified for 
       payment, interest shall be added to that payment at 
       the rate of 12% per annum from the date payment was 
       due. 
 
This provision, by its terms, applies only to payments 
required by the 1991 amendatory and supplementary act. 
It does not apply to Liberty's claim to recover a payment 
required by N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-15(a), which was 
codified in 1977 and is not part of the 1991 amendatory 
and supplementary act. Although section 56:10-15 was 
amended by the 1991 act, payments required by that 
section are not payments required by the 1991 act, but are 
payments required by the 1977 act.26 Liberty has not 
identified, and this court cannot discern, any abuse of 
discretion in the district court's determination that the 
interest rates provided for in New Jersey Court Rule 4:42- 
11 were equitable under the circumstances of this case. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's award of 
prejudgment interest. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Liberty argues that the N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-13.5 interest 
provision 
was "enacted at the same time the Legislature amended the warranty 
reimbursement provision" and is found in the"same statute which 
amended the NJFPA Warranty Reimbursement Act." Br. at 42; reply br. 
at 16. However, the 1991 amendments to N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-15 did 
not affect section 56:10-15(a) but simply added section 56:10-15(c) 
which is not implicated in this case. Liberty's arguments do not alter the 
fact that Liberty sought payments required by a preexisting provision, 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 56:10-15(a), and not by the 1991 amendatory and 
supplementary act. 
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F. Costs Associated With The Retail Rate Analysis 
 
The district court awarded Liberty counsel fees and costs 
associated with this litigation, but rejected Liberty's claim 
for fees and costs associated with Liberty I because Liberty 
was not a prevailing party in that case, which culminated 
in a denial of class certification and a stipulation of 
dismissal. See slip op. at 10-11. Liberty contends that the 
district court erroneously excluded, as a cost associated 
with Liberty I, the $26,185.15 in fees Liberty incurred in 
compiling a part-by-part analysis of its retail rate over six 
years. Liberty contends that, because it compiled the 
analysis after the dismissal in Liberty I,"in contemplation 
of and in preparation for" the instant case, and because its 
counsel "reviewed the analysis as part of its litigation 
strategy" and "briefed and argued" the results thereof in 
this litigation, the district court should have included the 
fees associated with the analysis in its fee award instead of 
excluding them along with the fees arising from Liberty I. 
Reply br. at 17-18; br. at 44. 
 
While the district court did not articulate a separate 
rationale for excluding the disputed fees along with the 
Liberty I fees, it is readily apparent that the fees at issue 
are not recoverable in this litigation. Liberty prevailed in 
this litigation on the issue of whether Ford could assess the 
dealer-parity surcharge to offset a retail-rate 
reimbursement, an issue that did not require any 
verification of Liberty's claimed retail rate. 27 Therefore the 
fees incurred in compiling the retail rate analysis were not 
"reasonably expended" in pursuit of the "result obtained" in 
this litigation, and thus properly were excluded from the fee 
award even if they were not incurred in connection with 
Liberty I. Slip op. at 10-11 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983)). We, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
27. Liberty arguably raised the issue of its retail rate in its Motion to 
Enforce the district court's March order. In that motion, however, Liberty 
contended that Ford was not entitled to demand documentation of 
Liberty's part-by-part retail rates over the past six months. Thus 
Liberty's 
motion in no way required a detailed analysis documenting those rates 
over the past six years. In any event, because Liberty was not entitled to 
the relief awarded in the September 19, 1996 order, Liberty has obtained 
no relief on any claim implicating the validity of its retail rates. 
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accordingly, will affirm the district court's exclusion of fees 
associated with Liberty's retail rate analysis from its fee 
award. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's September 19, 1996 order and will vacate and 
remand for reconsideration in light of this opinion the 
award of attorneys' fees in the district court's February 26, 
1997 final order. We, however, will affirm in all other 
respects. The parties will bear their own costs on this 
appeal. 
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